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INTRODUCTION 
 
John Friedrich and the insolvent National Safety Council Victorian Division (NSC) provided the 
popular press with the right mix of a manhunt, spies, fraud and odd characters to break circulation 
records.  Public interest in the matter spawned two `quickie' books about the mysterious Friedrich and 
the Council.1  When a judgment was delivered making one of the directors of the Council personally 
liable, academic writers were also handed good copy for law journals and a swag of industry 
magazines.2
 
  Friedrich and the NSC inspired commentators of all ilks to grind out thousands of words 
on all facets of the fraud from fanciful spy connections to the liability of directors. 
This paper strikes a different pitch as a considered reflection on the regulation of nonprofit entities.  It 
seeks a broader ken than permitted in a legal case note and a more considered view than the popular 
press.  It utilises material gained not only from the case reports, but newspapers and administrative 
records obtained through freedom of information requests.  It places the case not within a context of 
extrapolating the formal law or copy to sell tabloids, but the broader theoretical and practical issues of 
regulating  nonprofit companies.  This has been largely neglected in the literature to date.3
 
 
The paper introduces the reflection on nonprofit entities by briefly outlining the history of the NSC 
case.  Secondly, it reviews the response of the media and the corporate regulators to the issue of the 
regulation of nonprofit companies.  The third part of this paper provides an analysis of the regulatory 
issues that administrators face when dealing with nonprofit entities.  This last part of the paper draws 
on a wider context incorporating experiences from the American and English jurisdictions. 
 
PART ONE  -  THE NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL VICTORIAN DIVISION 
 
                                                     
1  J. Friedrich & R. Flanagan, Codename Iago - The Story of John Friedrich, William Heinemann Australia, Melbourne, 
1991; M. Thomas, The Fraud - Behind the Mystery of John Friedrich, Australia's Greatest Conman, Pagemasters Pty Ltd, 
Melbourne, 1991. 
2  J. Jason, `The Strange Case of John Friedrich?', New Dawn, Vol.1, No.5, 1991, pp.5-7; A.S. Sievers, `The National Safety 
Council Case', Company and Securities Law Journal, Vol.9, No.5, 1991, pp.338-343; A.S. Sievers, `The Honorary 
Director: The Obligations of Directors and Committee Members of Non-profit Companies and Associations', Company and 
Securities Law Journal, Vol.8, 1990, pp.87-109; A.S. Sievers, Recent Developments in the Liability of Directors and 
Committee Members of Non-profit Associations, Working Paper No.7, QUT Program on Nonprofit Corporations, 1992; M. 
McGregor-Lowndes, Limited by What? Guaranteed to Whom?, Criminology Australia, Vol.2, No.1, 1990, pp.2-4; N. 
Bushnell & M. Summons, NSCA Debacle Changes the Charity Game, Australian Business, Vol.9, No.23, 1989, pp.20-21; 
G. Hattam & C Richards, `The Friedrich Case', Communications Law Bulletin, Vol. 10, No.2, 1990, pp.13-14; S. Long, 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. John Friedrich, Eise & Others, Queensland Law Society Journal, Vol.21, No.4, 1991, 
pp.347-350; R. Baxt, `Publicity and Accountability', Australian Business Law Review, Vol.18, No.3, 1990, pp.193-195; M. 
McGregor-Lowndes, `Doing Good is No Excuse in Company Law', Legal Service Bulletin, Vol.16, No.6, 1991, pp. 279-
281; M. McGregor-Lowndes, `Guaranteeing Safer Companies', Legal Service Bulletin, Vol.14, No.4, 1989, pp.164-167; 
P.J. Booth, `Problems with Liquidators', Law Institute Journal, Vol.63, No.9, 1989, pp.808-809; G. Batemen, `Have you 
got $97 million to spare?', Australian Accountant, Vol.61, No.10, 1991, pp.32-34, 37; K. Lees-Amon, `A Local Community 
Counts the Cost in the Wake of the NSCA Collapse', Australian Municipal Journal, Vol.68, No.1026, 1989, pp.312-313; B. 
Bottom, J. Silvester, T. Noble & P. Daley, Inside Victoria, A Chronicle of Scandal, Pan Macmillan Publishers Australia, 
Melbourne, 1991. 
3  One exception is the last section of A.S. Sievers, `The Honorary Director: The Obligations of Directors and Committee 
Members of Non-profit Companies and Associations', Company and Securities Law Journal, Vol.8, 1990, pp.87-109. 
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The National Safety Council Victoria Division was a company limited by guarantee incorporated in 
1928 with a license by the Attorney General to omit the word "limited" from its name.4  It was formed 
by a coalition of Victorian nonprofit agencies with the charitable object of promoting safety awareness, 
particularly industrial safety.5  The company never lodged any accounts with the regulatory authorities 
and only sporadic notices of office bearers.6
 
  It had exemptions from income taxation and gifts to the 
company were tax deductible.  
Membership of the company was open to all willing to subscribe to the memorandum and articles and 
pay an annual subscription of one guinea.7  All members had an equal vote to elect a council of five 
members and 42 specified organisations had the right to appoint a representative to the council.8
 
  The 
specified organisations included a range of government agencies (police, fire service, railways) and 
nonprofit organisations such as chambers of commerce, car clubs, trades unions and some private 
companies (Ford).  The Council appointed an executive committee consisting of a President which 
they elected and then representatives from 14 named associations.  This membership structure will be 
commented on later in this paper as one aspect in the collapse. 
The NSC carried out safety awareness programs with an emphasis initially on the workplace but 
expanding to road and leisure activities.  It was funded through government grants and industry 
contributions, relying on volunteers to perform most of its functions.  In 1962 the Council fostered the 
establishment of similar organisations in the other states of Australia which became separate corporate 
entities.  It was at this time that the NSC began to contract a safety service to industry specialising in 
on-site training and safety auditing.  In 1979 it began to develop emergency services with the purchase 
of a fire tender. 
 
In 1982 under the charismatic leadership of its chief executive, John Friedrich, the organisation 
expanded into providing exotic forms of search and rescue.9
                                                     
4  It was originally registered on the 9th February, 1928 as the "National Safety Council of Australia", but changed its name 
in 1961 to "National Safety Council of Australia Victorian Division". 
  Its expansion was funded through 
commercial loans from financial institutions secured over sealed containers of rescue equipment.  
Most containers were empty and thus the security illusory.  The accounts of the organisation were also 
tampered with to show a better position, often in the form of illusory debtors.  There is also a 
suggestion that auditor's reports qualifying the accounts were tampered with by the chief executive 
before presentation to the board and lenders.  The matter was brought to a head when the board 
requested an independent financial assessment and the chief executive fled.  The company was placed 
5  The company also had public benevolent institution status under Section 78 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 
(Cth.) which permits donations over two dollars to be an allowable deduction from the donor's assessable income. 
6  A search of the Victorian Corporate Affairs records reveals that returns of officers were lodged in 1941, 1986 and 1988. 
7  Clauses 3, 4 & 5 of Articles of Association, dated 9 February 1928. 
8  Clause 8 of Articles of Association, dated 9 February 1928. 
9  For example the organisation had a stable of horses for search operations in rugged terrain, parachute teams to go to 
remote locations, firefighting planes, helicopters and even a rescue submarine. 
 Working Paper No.PONC42 - QUT 
 
 3 
into liquidation owing over three hundred million dollars. 
 
PART TWO  —  RESPONSES OF THE POPULAR PRESS AND ADMINISTRATORS 
 
In the thousands of tabloid column inches written about the fraud, little focussed seriously on matters 
concerning the regulation of nonprofit entities.  One editorial of the Australian Financial Review is 
quite perceptive and poses some very relevant questions about the regulation of nonprofit 
companies.10  It pointed out that the company was unrestrained by any effective corporate affairs or 
taxation office supervision, or any other government body, the Council was too large, uninterested, 
and met too infrequently to be an effective control of management and the organisational structure was 
neither `fish' nor `fowl'.11
 
  The editorial called for an investigation of other companies with a similar 
structure and questioned whether publicly available information on such organisations was not the first 
step to a proper regulation of such nonprofit companies.  These matters will all be addressed in later 
sections of this paper. 
The other issue which deserves to be noted from the popular press is that they had heralded the 
possibility of a fraud over a number of years.  These articles proved to be fairly accurate in hindsight.  
For example, in August 1988 Channel 10's Page One expressed concerns about the NSC and its 
operations, a local paper, the Bairnsdale Advertiser, as early as 1986 outlined extensive misgivings 
about the financial status of the NSC12 A large feature article in the Sydney Sun Herald by Wendy 
Bacon in October 1988 noted its accounts were puzzling, the company was unaccountable to the 
public and discrepancies existed between equipment purchased and income received.13
 
  
To this was added direct complaints to various authorities who were in a position to investigate the 
matters raised.  The chair of directors produced evidence of irregularities to the Commissioner of 
Police in October, 1988.14  The Victorian Treasurer was aware the NSC had prepared false invoices 
for 1.3 million dollars to the Victorian Government in November, 1988.15  The Federal Defence 
Department which had dealings with the NSC was alerted at departmental officer and Ministerial level 
in 1987 about irregularities in funding of the company.16
                                                     
10  The Australian Financial Review, 28 March, 1989, The Lessons of the NSCA Scandal. 
  The Victorian Corporate Affairs 
Commission received a written complaint in December, 1988 about the company, but the 
Commissioner was reported as saying that, "he was inhibited from acting because of a lack of hard 
11  Id. 
12  The Sunday Mail, 26 March, 1989, Story Was Just Too Hot and B. Bottom, J. Silvester, T. Noble & P. Daley, Inside 
Victoria, A Chronicle of Scandal, Pan Macmillan Publishers Australia, Melbourne, 1991 at p.157. 
13  W. Bacon, Sydney Sun Herald, 2 October, 1988 in an article entitled Death, Intrigue in the World of Skydiving. 
14  The Australian, 28 March, 1989, How Victoria's Police let the NSC Chief off the hook, 
15  The Australian, 29 March, 1989, Jolly blamed for disappearance, p.4. 
16  The Australian, 27 March, 1989, Beazley had NSC warning, p.1. 
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evidence."17
 
 No regulatory authority appears to have seriously investigated the complaints raised either 
in the media or by individuals and this again will be commented on later in this paper. 
After the collapse of the NSC, the most visible first response of the Victorian Corporate Affairs 
Commission was to write to all companies that had Section 66 licenses in Victoria to request a copy of 
their last audited financial statements.  The Commission could contact only sixty-two per cent of the 
companies on their register.18  Of those companies that replied twenty per cent did not have an audited 
financial statement as required by the Act and fifty-six per cent failed to comply with the accounting 
standards.19
 
  
A similar survey by the author in the previous year of Queensland companies limited by guarantee 
revealed strikingly similar results.20  This study included all companies limited by guarantee in 
Queensland and showed substantial default rates for the lodging of annual returns.21  Companies 
limited by guarantee had a default rate of some fifty-two per cent with thirty-one per cent being more 
than one year in arrears, and four per cent being more than ten years in arrears.22
 
 
Such default might be common for any registry, but the available data on commercial corporate 
registers is significantly lower.  Yum in 1979 found Victorian proprietary limited companies had an 
annual default rate of twenty-five per cent.23  In 1988, the National Companies and Securities 
Commission issued eighteen per cent of commercial companies with late penalty notices for 
lodgement of annual returns.24  In comparison for the same period, Queensland incorporated 
associations had a less than twenty percent default rate, but the Act had only been passed five years 
earlier and more than half the associations had not been registered for more than two years.25  There is 
a growing body of empirical evidence that nonprofit and charitable entity registers are characterised by 
greater levels of default than commercial registers.26
                                                     
17  N. Bushnell & M. Summons, op. cit., at p.21. 
 
18  This report is not public and was obtained by the author pursuant to a Freedom of Information Application. The report is 
dated 17 August 1989 from The Victorian Commissioner of Corporate Affairs to the Victorian State Attorney-General and 
to be found in the file of the National Safety Council - Victoria Division. 
19  Ibid., at p.3. 
20  McGregor-Lowndes, op. cit., at pp.91-94. 
21  M. McGregor-Lowndes, Regulatory Compliance of Two Forms of Nonprofit Enterprise, unpublished master's thesis, 
Griffith University, 1989. 
22  Ibid., at p.81. 
23  D.C. Yum, Control of Exempt Proprietary Companies - A Case for Change, unpublished master's thesis, University of 
New England, 1984, at p.74. 
24  Commonwealth of Australia, National Companies and Securities Commission Annual Report, 1989, Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, at p.16. 
25  Ibid., at p.143. 
26  For example in Australia refer to D.J. Williams & J. R. Warfe, The Charities Sector in Victoria - Characteristics and 
Public Accountability, Accounting and Finance, May 1982, pp.55-71; M. McGillivray, C.A. Romano & D.J. Williams, op. 
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The tangible results of the Victorian Commissioners activities were that deregistration proceedings 
were instigated against companies that did not reply to the Commissioner's request.27  About twenty 
companies were encouraged to migrate to the incorporated associations register immediately28 and 
only one formal investigation of a company initiated.29  The Commissioner also wrote to a number of 
companies advising that their account exemptions would be removed.  The Commission departed from 
the National Securities Commission handbook on such matters by devising criteria which quantified a 
level of commercial dealings over which it was not initially prepared to permit non-lodgement of 
accounts.30
 
 
The Commissioner also recommended to the Ministerial Council for Companies and Securities in 
September 1989 that section 66(5) of the Companies Act 1981 be repealed there by deleting the 
capacity to exempt companies from the requirement to lodge annual accounts.31  This had largely been 
effected by administrative means where it was administrative policy not to grant section 66(5) licenses 
since 1986.32
                                                                                                                                                 
cit., pp.307-317; M. McGregor-Lowndes, C. McDonald & D.Dwyer, `Public Fundraising Charities in Queensland', 
Working Paper No.14, Program on Nonprofit Corporations, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, 1993, at 
pp.18-19; New South Wales, Chief Secretary's Department, A Review of the Charitable Collections Act, 1934, Sydney, 
1989, at p.5; R. Radich, `An Analysis of the Differences in Audit Processes Used in the Audit of Nonprofit and Profit 
Organisations', Working Paper No. 19, Program on Nonprofit Corporations, Queensland University of Technology, 1993; 
and in England, M. Austin & J. Posnett, The Charity Sector in England and Wales - Characteristics and Public 
Accountability, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of 
York, Reprint Series, No.281, 1980, at p.3; Charities Aid Foundation, Report on Foundation Activity, London, 1976, at 
pp.6 & 21; Great Britain, Monitoring and Control of Charities in England and Wales, National Audit Office, HMSO, 
London, 1987; Great Britain, Committee of Public Accounts, 7th Report, HMSO, London, 1991, at p.vii; and in America, 
K.L. Karst, `The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility', Harvard Law Review, Vol.73, 
No.3, 1960, at pp.433-658 at p.456; United States of America, Report of the Commission on Private Philanthropy and 
Public Needs, Giving in America: Toward a Stronger Voluntary Sector, Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public 
Needs, Washington, 1975, Volume 5 at p.115; State Regulation of Charitable Trusts and Solicitations, The National 
Association of Attorneys General, Committee on the Office of Attorney General, Washington, 1977; Nonprofit Quality 
Reporting Project, Enhancing The Quality of Public Reporting by Nonprofit Organisations, New York, 1991, at p.11. 
  The following tables indicate the license granting patterns of the Queensland Corporate 
Affairs Register. 
27  Memo from Commissioner for Corporate Affairs to Victorian Attorney General dated 17 August, 1989 at p.2. 
28  Id. 
29  Ibid., at p.1. 
30  Contained in a letter from The Deputy Commissioner of Corporate Affairs to Mrs A.S. Sievers, dated 14 February, 1990 
which were 1. external creditors in excess of $50,000, a turnover in excess of $200,000, receipt of government grants, 
bequests or donations in excess of $20,000. 
31  Ministerial Council Paper prepared for the Victorian Attorney General for submission at the Ministerial Council for 
Companies and Securities September, 1989, at p.4. 
32  Minutes of section 66 meeting held on 6 and 7 February, 1986, item 2. At that meeting representatives from Victoria and 
the A.C.T. argued for statutory repeal of the section with Queensland and New South Wales pointing to the considerable 
opposition of vested interests.  
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TABLE 1 
Date of Exemption or Licence of Section 66 Companies* 
Queensland Register 
 
Year of Licence 66AD 66EA 66ED 66NE Total 66 Total Reg 
1989 - 1908 1 0 0 5 6 12 
1909 - 1918 0 0 0 5 5 7 
1919 - 1928 1 0 0 7 8 9 
1929 - 1938 0 0 0 5 5 9 
1939 - 1948 0 0 0 14 14 18 
1949 - 1958 0 0 0 17 17 33 
1959 - 1968 28 14 5 12 59 64 
1969 - 1978 25 9 50 16 100 304 
1979 - 1988 1 0 10 13 24 544 
 
* Only companies which are registered currently or deregistered since 1984 formed the sample. 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Classification of Section 66 Licence * 
Queensland Register 1978 - 1988 
 
Year of Licence 66AD 66EA 66ED 66NE 
78 0 0 6 2 
79 0 0 2 0 
80 0 0 2 3 
81 0 0 4 3 
82 0 0 1 1 
83 0 0 1 1 
84 0 0 0 1 
85 0 0 0 1 
86 1 0 0 0 
87 0 0 0 1 
88 0 0 0 2 
Total 1 0 16 15 
 
* Only companies which are registered currently or deregistered since 1984 formed the sample. 
 
Section 66AD - This company has a section 66 "limited" licence and is exempt from the 
lodging an annual return, return of directors, principal executive officers and 
secretary. 
 
Section 66EA - This company has a section 66 "limited" licence and is exempt from lodging 
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an annual return. 
 
Section 66ED - This company has a section 66 "limited" licence and is exempt from the 
lodging return of particulars of directors, principal executive officers and 
secretary. 
 
Section 66EA - This company has a section 66 "limited" licence but no other exemptions. 
 
The advent of the Corporations Law and the Australian Securities Commission continued a response 
to the issues raised in the National Safety Council fraud.  The Corporations Law contained Section 383 
which was substantially similar to section 66 of the Companies Code.  However, it did omit the 
provisions concerning the exemption of certain companies from lodging returns of officers and annual 
accounts.33
 
  Section 383(11) purported to save licences already granted to companies before the 
commencement of the Corporations Law.  Licences to omit the word "limited" from the name of a 
company are saved but it is not clear whether the licences for return of officers and accounts continue. 
The initial position of the ASC was that past licences were saved.34  The opinion was formed that 
Section 383(11) preserved all licences granted prior to the Corporations Law.  It would not include 
exemptions given to a company which were by way of notice in writing rather than being included in 
the formal licence.35  These exemptions were saved by the operation of state scheme legislation.36
 
 
However, the ASC completely reversed its opinion in October, 1991 and formed the view that all 
licences had been revoked.37  Arrangements were made to send a letter to all companies that had 
previously held such licences requiring an immediate return of office bearers to be lodged together 
with an annual audited accounts.38  This reversal appears to have been made after a telephone 
conference with a Melbourne QC in July, 199139 and an internal ASC Commission meeting in 
September.40
                                                     
33  Formerly section 66(5) Companies Code. 
  These documents have not been made available to the author under freedom of 
information and are subject to appeal.  The interpretation of the ASC of Section 383(11) could be 
capable of a serious challenge on several grounds, but that requires much more space than is available 
34  Internal memorandum from Legal Division to Manager Registration Procedures Business Operations Division, dated 27 
May, 1991 and circulated to ASC Business Offices on 12 June, 1991. 
35  It appears that this is the situation in the case of the NSC. The initial licence related only to the word "limited" and 
exemption from returns and annual accounts may have only been by a written notice which does not appear on the official 
public registry file of the company. 
36  For example Section 85 of the Corporations Law (State) Act. 
37  BOPS Newsletter No.37.12. 
38  Letter from Hartnell dated 19 October, 1991. 
39  Disclosed in written communication from the FOI Officer ASC, Melbourne to the author dated 28 February, 1992. 
40  Id. 
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here.41
 
 
At the same time, the letter to all formerly licensed companies limited by guarantee was sent, a policy 
statement about section 383 was released by the ASC.42  This policy statement was replaced in July 
199243 and again in March 1993.44
 
  The Commission has gradually refined the conditions upon which 
it will grant licences.   
The ASC as a matter of policy will only licence companies limited by guarantee rather than share 
capital companies.  There is a policy of restricting the ability of directors to be remunerated from the 
company for their services on the basis of enforcing the nondistribution constraint.45
 
  This policy is 
currently providing problems for such companies wishing to take advantage of the new section 241 
and 241A insurance provisions.  This is because section 234K deems the insurance premiums paid by 
a company for the officer of a public company to be remuneration incurred by that officer.  At the time 
of writing the ASC had not formalised their policy on such matters.  The policy also sets down criteria 
on which to assess whether the commercial activities of the company are significant and hence should 
not be permitted to trade without the word `limited' in its name.  The reasoning is that potential 
creditors should be aware its liability is limited. 
The policy overcomes a number of problems which have haunted such company regulation for many 
years and will be further identified in the later sections of this paper.  The ASC is are requiring all 
licences to be surrendered and new licences issued.  In previous regulatory regimes old licences were 
not updated, as illustrated in the NSC case.  Further, once the licence has been granted there is an 
obligation for the company to ensure it keeps within the terms of the licence and notify the ASC of any 
alterations.  The ASC it is actively monitoring the situation.  Queensland ASC Business Office is 
taking a particularly pro active stance in reminding company limited by guarantee's controllers of their 
responsibilities. 
 
There are a number of concerns in the policy statement that should be noted in passing.  The policy 
claims that the origin of the original exemptions for such companies was the Companies (Literary 
Institutions) Act 1883. The work of the author46 and more extensive recent work of Levy47
                                                     
41  Apart from the argument originally proposed by the ASC legal officers recourse could be had to the explanatory 
memorandum clause 1366 which on one interpretation suggests that previous licences would continue, the provisions of 
sections 7, 8 and 50 of the Commonwealth Acts Interpretation Act, the cases of Total (Australia) Limited v. Registrar of 
Companies [1969] VR 821 and Byrne v. Garrison [1965] VR 523, Sections 1349 and 1328 of the Corporations Law. 
 present 
42  Policy Release no.11, Revocation of a licence under s383. 
43  Policy Statement 29: Issue and Revocation of a Licence under Section 383 authorising the omission of the word `limited' 
in company names. 
44  Policy Statement No.50, Authorisation under Section 50 to omit `limited' from a company's name. 
45  The nondistribution constraint is a term first used by Henry Hansmann to describe the common restraint of a nonprofit 
entity in distributing profits to any person or purpose other than its sanctioned objectives. Refer H.B. Hansmann, `The Role 
of Nonprofit Enterprise', The Yale Law Journal, Vol.89, No.5, 1980, pp.835-898; H.B. Hansmann, `Reforming Nonprofit 
Corporation Law', University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol.129, No.3, 1981, pp.497-623. 
46  McGregor-Lowndes, op. cit. 
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cogent evidence this act played only a minor role in the legislative origins of the provisions.  This will 
be taken up later in this paper. 
 
The issue of director remuneration can also be debated on good policy and economic grounds.  
Volunteer directors are not necessarily appropriate for some nonprofit entities.  This debate has been 
raging in the United Kingdom and the United States.  Remuneration of directors may bring a host of 
advantages that overcome the incompetence displayed by many directors of charitable organisations.48
 
  
At this early stage, it is difficult to assess what effect the policy and its implementation is having on 
the regulation of companies limited by guarantee.  The default rates of companies limited by guarantee 
are not included in the annual statistics provided by the ASC and the policy of full cost recovery for 
record searches used in academic studies has meant that this will be difficult to ascertain in the future.  
The tables below are constructed from the ASC and NSC Annual Reports and do disclose the last two 
years have seen over 1,400 companies limited by guarantee deregistered.  This is the most dramatic 
clean up of the registry of companies limited by guarantee ever seen in Australia and it is to the credit 
of the ASC.  The studies of the Victorian and Queensland registers mentioned earlier would suggest 
there are yet still more defaulting companies which could be struck from the register.49
 TABLE 3 
 
 Total Companies Limited by 
 Guarantee Registered by State 
 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 ♥1991 1992 1993 
A.C.T. 226 241 264 272 — 318 354 373 376 
New South Wales 4,382 4,519 4,666 3,826 4,854 4,893 5,054 4,881 4,679 
Queensland 817 846 918 955 986 1,012 1,077 1,056 1,041 
South Australia 48 48 49 57 59 72 87 100 98 
Tasmania 223 231 239 ♦244 99 108 260 265 259 
Victoria 818 ♣(756) 975 ♣(1,854) ♠2,046 928 1,913 1,916 1,748 
Western Australia 57 63 68 74 83 40 72 86 89 
Northern Territory — 7 8 10 — 14 12 14 14 
TOTAL 6,571 6,711 7,187 7,292 8,127 7,385 ♠8,829 8,691 8,304 
 
Source: NCSC Annual reports.  ♦ The 1988 Annual Reports shows Tasmania as having 88 Companies registered by 
guarantee but this appears to be a mistake.  The figure of 244 comes from the Tasmania C.A.C. annual 1988 
report.  ♣ The figures from Victoria in 1986 and 1988 are estimates only.  ♠ Includes companies limited by 
shares and guarantee.  ♥ The figures for 1991 combine a 6 month NCSC Report and a six month ASC 
Report. 
                                                                                                                                                 
47  K.J. Levy, An Historical Analysis of Incorporated "Non-profit" Entities in the United Kingdom, New Zealand and 
Australia with the Purpose of Raising the "Profit/Non-profit Debate", Minor LL.M Thesis, University of Melbourne, 1993 
and K.J. Levy, Should Section 383 of the Corporations Law Still Exist in 2001?, A paper presented at the National 
Corporate Law Teachers Conference 1994, Sydney. 
48  McDonald, op. cit. 
49  The author searched 49 Queensland companies limited by guarantee in December 1993 and found that over half were 
still in breach of their annual return lodging requirements. 
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 TABLE 4 
 Yearly Incorporation of 
 Companies Limited by Guarantee by State 
 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
A.C.T. 22 18 23 8 22 29 24 27 196 
New South Wales 219 105 111 ♥137 156 124 113 149 173 
Queensland 37 34 55 36 60 47 66 73 77 
South Australia 2 — 7 8 10 5 8 12 6 
Tasmania 7 11 13 5 12 9 15 12 6 
Victoria 56 55 49 69 78 73 ♦28 59 85 
Western Australia 6 6 5 6 9 9 8 9 7 
Northern Territory — — 8 10 0 2 2 1 3 
TOTAL 349 229 271 279 347 298 ♠264 342 376 
 
 
Source: NCSC & ASC Annual Reports.  ♥ Includes companies limited by shares and guarantees. ♦ Victoria could 
only report 1 January 1991 to 30 June 1991, this figure is thus understated by probably fifty per cent.  ♠ Note 
total affected by ♦ understatement. 
 
 
PART THREE  — SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE REGULATION OF NONPROFIT 
AND CHARITABLE ENTITIES 
 
This part seeks to place the NSC case within a broader framework of the regulation of nonprofit 
entities.  It identifies a number of themes concerning the regulation of nonprofit entities which range 
across Australian, American and English jurisdictions.  The Australian Securities Commission has 
implemented a practical response to the previous regulatory failure of companies limited by guarantee, 
but it lacks any apparent insight into the systemic flaws which contributed to that failure or a clear 
vision as to the systemic reform which could benefit the regulation of such entities. 
 
The following part examines the fractured nature of regulation of activities of nonprofit entities and 
that situation's contribution to promoting regulatory failure.  The behavioural response of 
administrators to nonprofit entities which have what will be described as a `halo' is established and its 
ramifications explored.  The priority of the regulation of such entities for administrators and politicians 
is also identified as contributing to regulatory failure.  Finally, the patterns of formal legislative reform 
is examined for its part as well as the inappropriateness of regulatory instruments. 
 
FRACTURED AGENCIES 
 
"Fractured administrative agencies" describes the situation where no one agency of the state takes 
prime responsibility for the regulation of the organisation.  Evidence in the National Safety Council 
case study lends support to the notion that fractured administrative agencies contribute to undetected 
fraud.  The national agencies that could have possibly been involved with the regulation of the 
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National Safety Council were National Companies and Securities Commission and the Australian 
Taxation Office.  The Victorian agencies were, Victorian Corporate Affairs Commission, Victorian 
Attorney General, charitable fundraising regulators, and various government departments. 
 
Flowing from English legal traditions, the Victorian Attorney General has the inherent parens patriae 
jurisdiction to supervise, protect and control charities.  The National Safety Council had objects which 
if it were in the legal form of a trust would have been classified as charitable.50  There is no evidence it 
was a trustee for significant property as part of a charitable trust.  On the face of it the Attorney 
General would have no direct jurisdiction to intervene.  However, an unresolved issue in Anglo-
Australian law results where the corporation has only charitable objects.  The issue is whether such a 
company is perceived as in a position analogous to a trustee to its own property or ordinary corporate 
relationships remain unchanged.  The English judiciary has started to develop some charitable trust 
principles in the context of the corporation.51
 
  The evidence indicates that the Attorney was not 
interested in investigating the matter. 
The Australian Tax Office could have some regulatory role over a company such as the NSC.  The 
evidence points to no income tax returns ever being filed by the NSC.52
                                                     
50  Evidence for this is to be found in the fact that the organisation was found to qualify for exemptions under sections 23 
and 78 of the Income Tax Assessment Act and section 66 of the Companies Code. 
  It is common for the ATO to 
actively discourage those organisations with an exemption from income tax under Section 23 from 
51  Tudor notes on the basis of comments in Liverpool and District Hospital for Diseases of the Heart v. Attorney-General 
[1981] Ch. 193 
 
 With regard to the general property of a charitable company, the better view would seem to be that it is not 
subject to a trust in the strict sense but holds it subject to a binding legal obligation to apply it for charitable 
purposes only; the position of a charitable company in relation to its assets is, therefore, "analogous" to that 
of a trustee. S.G. Maurice, D.B. Parker, Tudor on Charities, op. cit., at p.410. 
 
Warburton argues that as the property is vested in the company and not the directors, so directors are to be more accurately 
described as "quasi-trustees or fiduciaries." J. Warburton, `Unauthorised Acts by Charities', Trust Law & Practice, October, 
1987, pp.46-50 at p.48.  She asserts that the Liverpool case may allow "the courts to apply full equitable remedies in the 
event of misapplication of charitable property." This assumes that it is in fact charitable property, which is different from 
directors or the company acting in a fiduciary like manner. 
 
In England the Charity Commissions have been statutorily given jurisdiction to supervise such companies.Section 46, 
Charities Act 1960 (U.K.) and section 35A Companies Act 1989, (U.K.); J. Warburton, `Charitable Companies and the 
Charities Act 1992', The Charity Law & Practice Review, Vol.1, 1992-3, pp.203-208; J. Warburton, `Charity Corporations: 
The Framework for the Future', The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, Vol.54, 1990, pp.95-105. In America, the drafters 
of the Model Nonprofit Corporations Law expressly rejected the doctrine "that corporations formed for charitable purposes 
hold their assets in trust for stated purposes at the time of acquisition of the respective assets and that the directors are 
trustees with respect thereto." 
 
The matter has been indirectly addressed in the Australia courts through the issue of whether a gift to a charitable 
corporation is a gift in trust or a gift to the corporation generally for its objects. Although the decisions espoused differing 
judicial views, it appears that a disposition to a charitable corporation will presumptively take affect as a trust for the 
purposes of the corporation rather than a gift to the corporation. Re Inman [1965] V.R. 258; Sir Moses Montefiore Jewish 
Home v. Howell and Co, (No.7) Pty Ltd [1984] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 406 and Victoria, `Report on Charitable Trusts', Chief 
Justice's Law Reform Committee, Melbourne, 1965 at p.26; H.A.J. Ford, `Dispositions for Purposes', in Essays in Equity, 
ed., P. Finn, Law Book Company Limited, Sydney, 1985 at p.168. 
52  Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. Friedrich & Ors. (1991) 9 ACLC 946 at p.960. 
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lodging a return.  In other jurisdictions the taxation authorities are theoretically relied on heavily to 
regulate nonprofit entities.  The American Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been perceived as the 
federal institution which could regulate such bodies, given the lack of response from the state 
Attorneys General.  After the Filer Commission, Congress increasingly used the IRS as a policy tool to 
attempt to control nonprofit entities. 
 
The Victorian Corporate Affairs Commission was described in the major litigation about the NSC as 
the prime regulator.  The judge found that in some years, no annual meetings were held,53 and 
accounts or reports were not presented to members.  The judge considered the fraud would not have 
occurred, "if there had been compliance with the fundamental provisions of the [companies] Code."54
 
  
The conclusion of several Victorian inquiries about the regulation of charities and nonprofit entities 
were that regulation of charities through a core administrative agency was not required because of 
other regulatory agencies, particularly those which provided registration of corporate status.55
 
  Such 
faith was not vindicated in the performance of the regulators of the National Safety Council. 
The situation of the NSC can be generalised to the regulation of most charitable entities.  The 
regulation of nonprofit entities by these fractured agencies is peripheral to their core missions and key 
constituencies.  The regulation is also increasingly fractured, with little co-ordination in theory or 
practice.  There is evidence that this is even the case in respect of the seemingly centralised English 
Charity Commission.  These two issues mitigate against efficient and appropriate monitoring and 
control in turn promoting regulatory failure. 
 
The fractured nature of regulatory agencies is notable in American and Australasian jurisdictions.  
Nonprofit entities are regulated by over seventy separate Australian federal statutory provisions 
representing nearly ten federal administrative agencies.  This welter of administrative agencies pales 
when compared to the number of statutory provisions and agencies in the states.  For example in New 
South Wales there are over 230 statutory provisions and fifteen administrative agencies.  None of these 
agencies have a core mission to regulate nonprofit entities. 
 
While it may appear that England is firmly in the grip of a central lead agency, this is not entirely the 
case.  Chesterman predicted in 1979 that the English regulatory regime of the Charity Commissioners,  
 
 ... is likely to be increasingly overshadowed by other distinct legal regimes, such as 
housing law, within which the supervision of government-subsidised charities will fall 
increasingly to specialised government departments and agencies, such as the Housing 
                                                     
53  Ibid., at p.975. 
54  Ibid., at p.979. 
55  Victoria, Victorian State Government Interdepartmental Working Party, `Administration of Charities', 2nd Report, 
Victorian Government Printer, Melbourne, 31 March 1982 at p.69; Victoria, `Review of Health Legislation', Discussion 
Paper No.8, Health Department Victoria, 1987, Victorian Government Printer, Melbourne, at p.6. 
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Corporations.56
 
 
This was confirmed by the Chief Commissioner of the Charity Commission who stated in an 
interview,  
 
 Moreover, in these days when many other government departments were providing grants, 
subsidies, and fees to a wide range of charities, these other departments might be said to 
have a greater incentive, and indeed a greater responsibility, to check positively that 
public money was not being wasted through mismanagement or misconduct on the part of 
charities.57
 
 
State agencies which provide grants to nonprofit entities have been pressured towards greater 
accountability of those grants.  Rather than relying on other state agencies charged with the 
responsibility of ensuring the fidelity of such entities, state donor agencies have adopted their own 
fidelity measures.  This usually amounts to replication of filing of audited financial returns.  These 
returns, if scrutinised, are usually vetted by staff without accounting or regulatory experience, an 
experience singularly lacking in state welfare agencies.  One different strategy has been to load this 
expense on to the nonprofit entity by making funds contingent on extensive private auditor's reports 
whose costs are borne by the entity.58
 
 
These donor agencies are likely only to be interested in the entities they use to transfer property and 
only in the state property transferred.  Entities without a relationship with such agencies will not be 
regulated by such agencies and other state property transfers activities may not be regulated.  To 
abdicate the responsibility of the state for ensuring fidelity of entities to donor agencies has serious 
implications.  
 
The actions of these donor agencies in not accepting the state fidelity assurance mechanisms for the 
transfer of property is also a comment on the actual state of the regulation of entities.  As Ellman 
suggests of American states, states are unwilling to bear the transaction costs of making contacts, and 
monitoring and enforcing contracts for gratuitous property transfers for donors.59
                                                     
56  M. Chesterman, Charities, Trusts and Social Welfare, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1979, at p.386 and this is 
again repeated in similar terms at p.406. 
  Such incentives to 
duplicate, largely ineffective controls may not be so great if donor agencies could rely on a body such 
as the Charity Commission to achieve a reasonable standard of regulation.  It may also mean 
considerable savings for both the state and nonprofit entities for there to be one competent lead 
administrative agency, acting as an information broker. 
57  J. Douglas and P. Wright, `English Charities, Legal Definition, Taxation and Regulation', Program on Nonprofit 
Organisation Working Paper No.15, no date, Yale University, New Haven, at p.50. 
58  For example the Queensland Art Unions and Public Amusements Act (Qld, 1992) Regulation 21 or 1992 Skillshare 
Auditor's Package, Department of Employment Education and Training, Canberra, 1992. 
59  I.M. Ellman, `Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations', Michigan Law Review, Vol.80, 1982, pp.999-1050 at p.1015. 
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The fractured nature of nonprofit entity regulation encourages a number of behaviours which promote 
regulatory failure.  The first, identified by Professor Henry Hansmann in relation to the IRS 
performing a role in the enforcement of the nondistribution constraint of nonprofit corporations, was 
that the IRS  "have at best only a indirect interest in policing the fiduciary behaviour in nonprofits."60
 
  
He continues, 
 to be sure the IRS, must necessarily police transactions of all sorts to ensure that those 
upon whom taxes are levied actually pay them.  But strict enforcement of the 
nondistribution constraint among tax-exempt nonprofits will generally not lead to an 
increase in federal revenues; rather, it will simply ensure that less of the nonprofit's 
income goes to its managers and more goes to further their purposes for which the 
patrons have contributed funds.  Burdening the revenue system with such non-tax 
objectives threatens to confuse its mission and dilute its effectiveness.61
 
 
Krever writes in a similar tone that, 
 
 A tax expenditure program is also administratively inefficient because it transfers to tax 
officials responsibility for supervising programmes in areas in which they have no 
expertise or experience.  Tax assessors and auditors are trained, in the first instance, in 
accounting and income measurement skills.  They have no qualifications in social welfare 
or the related areas to which the charitable gifts expenditure is directed.62
 
 
Similar remarks have been made by inquiries in England,63 the United States,64 New Zealand,65 and 
Australia66
 
 about regulation by the taxation agencies. 
Secondly, fractured agencies cause those who are charged with the responsibility of regulation within 
these agencies of regarding it as low priority, a backwater eddy compared to the main flow of the 
                                                     
60  H.B. Hansmann, `Reforming the Nonprofit Corporation Law', op. cit., at p.604. 
61  Id.  
62  R. Krever, `Tax Deductions for Charitable Donations: A Tax Expenditure Analysis', in Charities and Philanthropic 
Institutions: Reforming the Tax Subsidy and Regulatory Regimes, eds. R. Krever & G. Kewley, Comparative Public Policy 
Research Unit, Monash University and Australian Tax Research Foundation, Melbourne, 1992. 
63  Great Britain, National Audit Office, `Monitoring and Control of Charities in England and Wales', Cmd. 380, HMSO, 
London, 1987 at p.12. 
64  United States of America, `Report of the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, Giving in America:  
Toward a Stronger Voluntary Sector', Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, Washington, 1975 at p.2577 
(hereinafter referred to as `Filer Commission'). 
65  New Zealand, `Report to the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Social Welfare by the Working Party on Charities 
and Sporting Bodies', New Zealand Government Printer, Wellington, 1989 at p.34. 
66  Victoria, Victorian Legal and Constitutional Committee, `A Report to Parliament on The Law Relating to Charitable 
Trusts', Victorian Government Printer, Melbourne, 1989 at p.39. 
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agency's responsibilities.  In a matching of resources to responsibilities, low priority regulatory 
responsibilities will suffer.  In Queensland, for example the Annual Report of the Justice Department, 
a department which administers five acts concerning regulation of charitable fundraising, 
reconstruction of failed charities and registration of corporate nonprofit entities, contains only one 
paragraph that merely acknowledges responsibility for the statutes.67  The Annual Reports of the 
Australian Securities Commission which incorporates nonprofit entities, registers nonprofit bodies that 
trade across state borders and exempts them from compliance with parts of the legislation, contains no 
statistics or comments on exemptions or interstate nonprofit registrations.68
 
  These reports indicate the 
lack of importance placed by the administrators on their responsibilities for regulating nonprofit 
organisations.  This theme of backwater policy environments and lack of resources will be further 
examined in a latter section of this paper.  
These indications of a lack of prime interest in the regulation of nonprofit entities help to explain 
regulatory failure.  Serious implications flow from this fractured environment for the reliance of other 
government agencies on the regulation that is formally the responsibility of another.  The agency 
incorporating nonprofit entities, for example, may be relied on to scrutinise the fidelity of such entities 
by other agencies.  These agencies may have responsibilities for regulating other activities of that 
entity, such as the conduct of fundraising, gambling, taxation or providing funding.  To avoid 
duplication they may assume that such regulation is being carried out and regulate accordingly.  If this 
is not the case they may decide to regulate as well in that area.  The situation arises where the 
regulation amongst fractured agencies is not co-ordinated.  Reliance placed on other agencies is often 
misplaced.  If no reliance is placed on other agencies, then duplication of regulatory effort occurs. 
 
HALO 
 
This section describes the behaviour of administrators, that results from the social and cultural norms 
associated with charity.  The societal perception of charitable organisations being "good", "worthy", 
"moral", "altruistic", "philanthropic", "compassionate", "loving", "caring" and "beyond reproach" has 
significant implications for those who seek to regulate such organisations.  Such widely held 
perceptions lead to nonprofit entities and charities in particular, having an "aura" or "halo" which tend 
to give them saintly qualities.69
                                                     
67  For example the 1992 Annual Report is 76 pages long and includes only 17 words about the administration of the acts. 
  This section examines the evidence for the halo and its recognition by 
administrators.  The section then examines the effect the halo has on conventional external strategies 
for monitoring and control, such as punitive sanctions, inspection, and adverse publicity.  This is 
illustrated by reference to materials from the National Safety Council case study. 
68  Commonwealth of Australia, `Annual Report of the Australian Security Commission', 1992, AGPS, Canberra; does 
contain a figure on the number of registrations of companies limited by shares which are mostly nonprofit companies at 
p.80, but it does not distinguish between companies limited by shares and companies limited by guarantee and shares.  It 
does not disclose "Australian Registered Business Names" which are probably entirely nonprofit entities. 
69  The word `halo' commonly means a disc of light that surrounds the head in representations of the Christ and Saints. The 
halo is used extensively in religious icons, clearly depicting the ideal glory with which a person is invested. In the mind of 
the public, gratuitous intermediaries take on a halo because of their links with philanthropy, altruism, pity, compassion, 
generosity, sympathy and empathy which are emotionally powerful when linked to areas of concern for a society such as its 
very young, sick, elderly, the deserving distressed of society and animals. 
 Working Paper No.PONC42 - QUT 
 
 16 
 
One source of evidence for the halo is to be found in public inquiries.  Most wax lyrical about the 
philanthropic and altruistic motives of charities and their donors in the welfare of society.  Perhaps the 
most eloquent exploitation of the halo is found in the Nathan Report which devoted its first chapter to 
the value of charity in modern social structure.70  The chapter measured the maturity of a civilisation 
by the state of its charity71 and claimed the urban poverty of the industrial revolution "was swept back 
with a broom by the valiant ...  efforts of charity."72
 
 To those who might be sceptical of the place of 
charity within society, the Report stated, 
 Indeed, we think that those who deny its importance can have but scant understanding of 
the historical process or of the forces which make for social cohesion, enrich social life 
and deepen social responsibility.73
 
 
Over thirty-five years later, with an accompanying ideological shift from the welfare state to the 
economic rationalist views of the Thatcher government, a similar but shortened homily to the virtue of 
charity appears in the White Paper on Charity.74  Phrases such as "enormous importance in the history 
of this country, and it remains so today", "plays a crucial role in engaging and directing the efforts of 
individuals who wish to help those in need", "pioneering efforts of the voluntary sector" give an 
indication little has changed.75  These sentiments are acknowledged in varying degrees in other 
jurisdictions by similar public inquiries.76
 
  
There is evidence this presumed predisposition to sentiment and securing the high moral ground 
demonstrated by inquiry reports has also been adopted by regulatory agencies.  The first sentence, for 
example, of the Charity Commission's corporate mission statement is, "Charity is precious in the life 
of a nation", and ends with its primary mission, "... so we can say to one and all, You can trust 
charity."77
                                                     
70  Great Britain, `Report of the Committee on the Law and Practice relating to Charitable Trusts', Cmd. 8710, HMSO, 
London, 1952, at pp.7-15, (hereinafter referred to as the Nathan Report). 
 The Commission's mission is to ensure the maintenance of the halo, as much as it is to 
regulate conduct. 
71  Ibid., at p.7. 
72  Ibid., at p.9. 
73  Ibid., at p.14. 
74  Great Britain, `Charities: A Framework For the Future', Cmd. 694, HMSO, London, 1989, at p.1. 
75  Ibid., at p.1. 
76  For example, Filer Commission, Vol. 5 p.2575; Victoria, `A Report to Parliament on the Law Relating to Charitable 
Trusts', No.54, Government Printer, Melbourne, 1989 at p.3; New Zealand, `Report to the Minister of Finance and the 
Minister of Social Welfare by the Working Party on Charities and Sporting Bodies', New Zealand Government Printer, 
Wellington, 1989, at p.80. 
77  `Role and Functions', Charity Commissioners for England and Wales, HMSO, London, 1989 at p.1. 
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The phenomena of the halo is also commented on in a number of academic works. Mendelson noted, 
 
 the image of a nonprofit carries with it a halo of probity in a capitalist society; one 
imagines the gentle administrator of a church-owned nursing home who spends his time in 
good works for the benefits of his patients, rather than in calculating new ways to beat the 
government.78
 
 
Other scholars have also incidentally noted the role played by trustworthiness of nonprofit 
organisations.79  Forbes magazine which initiated an annual listing of the "Top 500" American 
nonprofit organisations accompanied its first list with an article entitled, Businessmen with Halos.80
 
 
The importance of trust is intuitively recognised by those who control nonprofit organisations and the 
identified legal devices are promoted by additional strategies enhancing the perception of trust for 
donors.81
 
  This self-generated promotion of the entity as "trustworthy" further reinforces and maintains 
an organisational halo.  
The importance of the halo can be appreciated by the consequences of the destruction of trust.  Loss of 
trust may mean the ability of the nonprofit entity to attract donors is vastly reduced and even results in 
the death of the entity.  Examples abound of such charities whose trustworthiness has been questioned 
resulting in dire financial consequences.82
 
  The reaction to the destruction of the halo is often greater 
than the response to a similar transgression from other than a nonprofit entity.  This was perceptively 
noted by Ellman in an article seeking to rebut Hansmann's thesis on the economic function of 
nonprofit corporations as, 
 theft or embezzlement by a pastor, a March of Dimes organiser, or a Salvation Army 
Santa Clause evokes a distinctive outrage.  That same feeling is not generated by the self-
                                                     
78  M.A. Mendelson, Tender Loving Greed, ?, New York, 1974 at p.195, cited in A. Etzioni & P. Doty, Profit in Not-for-
profit Corporations: The Example of Health Care, Political Science Quarterly, Vol.91, No.3, 1976, pp.433-453. 
79  I.R. Ellman, op. cit., at p.1018; Chesterman, op. cit., at p.307; H.L. Oleck, op. cit., at p.233; Hansmann, `The Role of 
Nonprofit Enterprise', op. cit., at p.580. J.G. Simon, `Modern Welfare State Policy Toward the Nonprofit Sector: Some 
Efficiency - Equity Dilemma, in The Third Sector: Comparative Studies of Nonprofit Organisations', ed. H.K. Anheier & 
W. Seibel, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1990, at p.38. 
80  J. Cook, `Business with Halos', Forbes, 26 November, 1990, pp.100-104. It notes that, "These institutions [nonprofits] 
come armed with what the for-profit sector calls the halo effect: Because of the purity and nobility of their goals, most 
people expect them to provide superior quality and services." at p.100. 
81  For example having members of the community who are believed to be beyond reproach on the management of the 
gratuitous entity or endorsing its activities. This is a fundamental strategy in any fundraising campaign. Patrons in the form 
of the Monarch, head of state or political leaders are also devices to reinforce trustworthiness.  
82  For example in America, the United Way scandal with allegations of over remuneration of management, K.A. Goss, `A 
Crisis of Credibility for America's Non-profits', The Chronicle of Philanthropy, Vol.V, No.17, 1993, at p.1; Covenant 
House scandal with allegations of sexual and financial impropriety, W.A. Baker, `The Wider Implications of Covenant 
House's Troubles', Chronicle of Philanthropy, Vol.II, April 17 1990 at p.30, `Covenant House Cuts Staff and Programs', 
Chronicle of Philanthropy, Vol.II, June 12 1990, at p.15; P. Bayless, `Directors Face Heat in a Charity Crisis: Covenant 
House', Crains New York Business, Vol.6, No.1, 26 February 1990 at p.30. 
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dealing of a business corporation director, reprehensible as we may believe it is.  The 
difference lies in the special insult we feel when everyday evil, which we may learn to 
watch for, sneaks up on us disguised as virtue.83
 
 
In the case of the NSC the authorities were reluctant to act on the press reports and complaints because 
they would be seen to be defiling the reputation of a worthy community organisation.  Administrators 
who live with the day to day realities are aware of the consequences of adverse publicity for a 
nonprofit entity.  In the short term, donees may fail to receive volunteer labour, grants and donations.  
This results from donors refusing to transfer property through a suspect nonprofit entity because of 
lack of trust.  This is further exacerbated where there is no other nonprofit organisation to substitute 
for the blemished entity.  To bring to the attention of the public or even the board of a nonprofit entity 
regulatory transgressions, may have serious consequences for donees and the entity itself.  It may also 
have serious consequences for the state and its administrators.  The state may have to fill the gap in 
services and administration subjected to an inquiry into the particular matter and regulation 
generally.84
 
 
HALO AS A POWER SOURCE 
 
Nonprofit entities can use their halo to direct effective pressure on administrators and politicians.  
Chesterman notes of the Charity Commission that, 
 
 Even the potentially strong compulsive powers - for example, the power to order accounts 
to be submitted on the pain of contempt proceedings - are unlikely to be invoked too often 
because the commissioners do not want to appear to be treading too hard or too 
frequently on the toes of charity trustees.85
 
 
H.L. Oleck writes of American administrators that, 
 
 State attorneys-general practically shun investigations of non-profit organizations.  If they 
do investigate them, they make powerful enemies; if they punish them, they make 
vindictive enemies of the richest and most influential people and organizations in the 
state; and if they stop abuses they thereby stop up the wells of charity, and we are damned 
for doing that (not that they do it hardly at all).86
 
 
The last statement also introduces a commonly used threat that greater accountability and scrutiny of 
nonprofit entities will cause the "voluntary spirit" to dry up.  Here the threat is their work will cease, 
                                                     
83  I.R. Ellman, op. cit., at p.1018. 
84  This point is recognised by Ware in his chapter on regulation of Intermediate Organisations, A. Ware, Between Profit 
and State: Intermediate Organisations in Britain and the United States, Polity Press, Oxford, 1989, at p.202. 
85  Chesterman, op. cit., at p.307. 
86  H.L. Oleck, op. cit., at p.233. 
 Working Paper No.PONC42 - QUT 
 
 19 
either harming donees or forcing the state to step in to supply such property.  This strategy has been 
used effectively to thwart the implementation of inquiry recommendations.87  The threat has even been 
accepted as the basis for immunity from civil suit for gratuitous intermediaries and their members.88
 
  
The argument is, if volunteers of nonprofit organisations are exposed to liability, then they may not 
volunteer their services which would lead to inappropriate consequences for donees and the state.  This 
threat of withdrawal again influences the administrator in the use of punitive sanctions or publicity to 
regulate nonprofit entities. 
The National Safety Council case study indicates the pervasiveness of the halo phenomenon.  In 1986 
the National Safety Council Victorian Division sought to alter its constitution to permit it to engage in 
a commercial leasing arrangement of its specialised forest firefighting planes to a Canadian company 
during the Australian winter.  The National Companies and Securities Commission Procedures 
Handbook required proposed amendments to licensed companies' constitutions to be approved by the 
Commission.89  The provisions set out that the whole constitution was to be reviewed to ensure that all 
the latest administrative guidelines were meet.90
 
 
Officers of the Victorian Commissioner of Corporate Affairs carried out a review of the constitution of 
the company.  They concluded many aspects of the organisation's constitution did not comply with the 
procedures manual and required major revisions.91  The National Safety Council responded to this 
administrative requirement with a campaign against the imposed constitutional changes by a number 
of effective lobbying strategies.  Its "in house" company lawyer made a lengthy legal submission to the 
Commission arguing legally that the Commission's actions were unduly restrictive and then relied 
heavily on the organisation's "halo".92  Restricting the National Safety Council from operating in 
various ways was portrayed as not only harming the company, but leaving Australians prey to the 
ravages of summer bushfires and denying them access to lifesaving overseas technology.93  This was 
followed by many references and letters from friends of the Council.  Hospital Registrars, Chief Fire 
Officers, Directors-General of other government departments, the Federal Department of Defence and 
on Air Vice Marshal are just some of those that supported the National Safety Council.94
                                                     
87  Chesterman, op. cit., at p.406. 
 
88  Victoria, `A Report to Parliament on the Public Liability of Voluntary Organisations', Legal and Constitutional 
Committee of the Victorian Parliament, No.50, Victorian Government Printer, Melbourne, at p.3; R. Tremper, 
Reconsidering Legal Liability and Insurance for Nonprofit Organisations, Law College Education Services Inc, Lincoln, 
Nebraska, 1989, Appendix D and pp.27-35. 
89  `Companies Act and Codes Procedures Handbook', Section 66 Companies, Staff Paper 808, National Companies and 
Securities Commission, 1982 at p.808515. 
90  Ibid., at para. 3.02.05. 
91  Commissioner for Corporate Affairs to Mr M. Quigby, Solicitor for National Safety Council of Australia, Victorian 
Division (Corporate Affairs Office file), dated 3 August, 1987. 
92  Kerry Pollard, Legal Officer of National Safety Council of Australia Victorian Division to Commissioner for Corporate 
Affairs (Corporate Affairs Office file), dated 13 October, 1987. 
93  Ibid., at p.7. 
94  Letters on file with Victorian Corporate Affairs Office, National Safety Council Victorian Division - correspondence file. 
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The State Council of the National Safety Council included an impressive list of over thirty 
representatives from such organisations as the Australian Institute of Management, Australian Medical 
Association, Commonwealth Government Departments of Aviation and Transport, Victorian 
Government Departments of Conservation Forests and Lands, Health and Transport, Gas and Fuel 
Corporation of Victorian, State Insurance Office and Victoria Police to name just a few.95  It had Vice-
Regal patronage.  The chair was a former mayor with an M.B.E. and in 1988 the chief executive, 
Friedrich was awarded an Order of Australia.96
 
  All contributing to the halo of the National Safety 
Council. 
The matter of alterations to the constitution was placed before the National Companies and Securities 
Commission who acquiesced to the National Safety Council's submissions, with the Victorian 
Commissioner not making any submission on the matter.97  The National Safety Council was able to 
operate substantially outside the policy guidelines, which according to the judge contributed to the 
extent of the massive fraud.98
 
 
The halo is not confined to administrators, but affects many others who may have some controlling 
power.  The National Safety Council's relations with astute commercial financial institutions is also 
tainted with the use of the halo.  The National Safety Council Victorian Division approached twenty-
seven Australian and international financial institutions for loans worth millions of dollars.  The halo 
helped induce these financial institutions into making huge loans.  The State Bank of Victoria's officer 
wrote in an internal bank memorandum, 
 
 NSCA's status (non profit-making and tax exempt) and its role as a provider of community 
service in the fields of health, safety and emergency services render it for practical 
purposes a quasi government body.  It has developed and grown to such an extent that it 
has in my view become indispensable.99
 
 
The judge in one case relating to the fraud noted, 
 
 Arrant propaganda by Friedrich secured the confidence of officers of the State Bank of 
Victoria, who were led to regard loans to the company as virtually without risk.  In 
particular the bank was influenced by the composition of the State Council of the company 
(which included nominees of government departments), the calibre of its supposed 
                                                     
95  Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. Friedrich & Ors (1991) 9 ACLC 946 at p.960. 
96  Id., at p.964. 
97  Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (Victoria) to The Chairman, National Companies and Securities Commission 
(Corporate Affairs Office file), facsimile dated 18 November, 1987, on file with the Victorian Commissioner of Corporate 
Affairs. 
98  Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. Friedrich & Ors. (1991) 9 ACLC 946 at p.975. 
99  Id., at p.984. 
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directors, its supposedly indispensable place in the community and invulnerable position 
in an almost competitor-free market.100
 
 
The halo phenomenon induced a lack of customary caution, short cutting, ineffective security 
monitoring on the part of, not just one, but over twenty five substantial financial institutions.  This 
organisation was not perceived as a commercial market participant, but a trusted and revered social 
entity that could do no wrong.  
 
A study of the case reveals a further influence of the halo phenomenon on the making of policy.  In the 
Victorian Commission's report on reform to legislation and administrative practices to prevent a 
similar case recurring, it warned, 
 
 Experience shows that a majority of companies with a section 66 licence jealously guard 
their privilege to delete the word "limited" (if not the exemption from filing accounts).  
Any attempt to repeal the Section can be expected to generate significant and vocal 
opposition from influential community groups.101
 
 
and concluded, 
 
 Any move to revoke such exemptions can be expected to meet with vocal and influential 
opposition, with the most vocal section in Victoria probably coming from the large private 
schools.102
 
 
The halo of nonprofit entities and the administrator's aversion to standard punitive responses results in 
administrators adopting strategies akin to the gentle counselling of saints on how to better achieve their 
heavenly tasks, rather than to their traumatic excommunication.  
 
Several commentators and inquires have noticed this attribute in relation to the English Charity 
Commission.  Douglas and Wright commented that the Charity Commission mostly has, 
 an incentive to maintain good relations with charities and their trustees.103
 
 
with the Commissioners perceiving their role as, 
 essentially as a supportive agency, advising and persuading charities rather than 
dragooning them by compulsory regulation.104
                                                     
100  Id., at p.984. 
 
101  Corporate Affairs - Victoria, memorandum to Victorian Attorney General. (On file with Victorian Commissioner of 
Corporate Affairs), date 17 August 1989, at p.2. 
102  Ibid., at p.3. 
103  Douglas & Wright, op. cit., at p.48. 
104  Ibid., at p.52. 
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The `Tenth Expenditure Report of the Expenditure Committee 1974-5', noted of the Charity 
Commission that, 
 
 We feel that in living up to their self-imposed image of benevolent family solicitors the 
Commissioners have given perhaps too much of their legal duties as opposed to their 
responsibilities on other spheres.105
 
 
Despite being goaded to change in that report, a latter Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee 
noted, 
 
 ... I get the impression that not a lot has changed since that report twelve years ago.  You 
are not supposed to be benevolent family solicitors, you are supposed to be the watchdog 
of public interests.106
 
 
The Charity Commission's governing Act sets the ways of achieving their objectives, in the following 
terms, 
 
 (a) by encouraging the development of better methods of administration, 
 (b) by giving charity trustees information or advice on any matter affecting the charity, 
and 
 (c) by investigating and checking abuses.107
 
 
The first two objectives sit comfortably with the actual practice of the Commission.  Their perceived 
role as adviser to charity is reflected by the deployment of the Charity Commission's staff of 330, with 
only 8 staff employed on the examination of accounts and investigation of abuse and a "high 
proportion of resources directed to those divisions responsible for the Commission's quasi-judicial and 
advisory functions".108  This feature is also discernible in Australasian jurisdictions109
 
 where a report 
on the form of association legislative reform noted, 
 So, as far as possible, the accent should be on simplicity, informality, and inexpensiveness, 
and on encouragement to incorporate rather than the need to satisfy high standards.  It 
should be administered in an atmosphere of advice and encouragement, rather than 
                                                     
105  United Kingdom, `Tenth Expenditure Report of the Expenditure Committee, 1974-5', op. cit., at p.8. 
106  United Kingdom, Sixteenth Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, `Monitoring and Control of Charities in 
England and Wales', HMSO, London, 1988 at p.5. 
107  Section 1 Charities Act 1960 (U.K.). 
108  United Kingdom, National Audit Office, `Monitoring and Control of Charities in England and Wales', Cmd. 380, 
HMSO, London, 1987, at p.9. 
109  New Zealand, `Report to the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Social Welfare by the Working Party on Charities 
and Sporting Bodies', New Zealand Government Printer, Wellington, 1989 at p.68. 
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policing.110
 
 
Another recommended that, 
 
 ...  this separate independent body may be able to discuss matters informally with trustees 
as well as providing advice and opinions.111
 
  
Chesterman while identifying the administrator's behaviour, perceives the Commission's conservative, 
non-interventionist stance as a result of the incompatible roles as a "friendly" adviser and 
supervisor.112
 
  This paper suggests the emphasis on "friendly" adviser flows also from the difficulties 
of supervision of gratuitous intermediaries relating to the halo phenomenon rather than an 
incompatibility of the two roles.  
An alternative analysis of this situation might be to apply capture theory as an explanation of the 
behaviour.113
 
  Capture theory propounds that regulation in the public interest may not be achieved 
because in the process of regulation the regulatee comes to control or dominate the administrator or 
even co-opt the administrator into a mutually shared perspective.  The previous analysis in this paper 
points to the nonprofit entity and the administrator sharing a perspective which enables a mutually 
supportive co-existence.  This is not the result of any co-ordinated intentional lobbying process but due 
to the inherent characteristic flowing from nature of these sorts of organisations.  
The halo phenomenon thus has important consequences for administrators and influences the 
regulatory strategies that they employ.  In devising the legal framework and regulatory strategies, the 
halo phenomenon should be acknowledged and taken into account.  If it is not, administrators will be 
encouraged into behaviours that do not appropriately regulate nonprofit entities. 
 
A QUIET BACKWATER 
 
Lack of resources is a consistent reason given for the regulatory failure of administrators to scrutinise 
and control nonprofit entities.  The evidence of inquiries in England, United States, Australia and New 
Zealand all observe that administrators have lacked resources necessary for functions such as the 
maintenance and scrutiny of registers, investigations and pro-active audits.114
                                                     
110  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, `Unincorporated Associations - Memorandum and Draft Legislation', 
Sydney, 1977, at p.31. 
  This is corroborated by 
111  Victoria, Victorian Legal and Constitutional Committee, `A Report to Parliament on The Law Relating to Charitable 
Trusts', Victorian Government Printer, Melbourne, 1989, at p.84. 
112  Chesterman, op. cit., at p.307. 
113  R. Posner, `Theories of Economic Regulation', Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Autumn, 1974, 
pp.335-358; P. Quirk, Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1981; B. Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulation, Columbia University Press, New York, 1980; G. Rowe, 
`Economic Theories of the Nature of Regulatory Activity', in R. Tomasic, (ed.), Business Regulation in Australia, CCH 
Australia Limited, North Ryde, Sydney, 1984. 
114  Chapter Three at p.123. 
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academic comment.115
 
 
Some have claimed that the task is impossible.  The English Chief Commissioner explained to J. 
Douglas and P. Wright that,  
 
 it was manifestly impossible to expect the Commission to exercise any sort of detailed 
surveillance over some hundred and thirty thousand charities.116
 
 
This explanation is unconvincing as strategies exist for other regulatory agencies, such as those 
supervising commercial companies, to deal with eight to ten times that number of entities with a fair 
degree of effectiveness.117
 
 
The lack of resources is a fact, but what has caused resource shortfall? One answer may be that the 
administrators may, as they claim to inquiries, receive insufficient funds from the government.  
Alternatively, it may be that administrators do not prioritise the given funds for charity regulation, but 
for other ancillary purposes.  It probably is a combination of both explanations.  The reasons for this 
behaviour are varied, but it is reinforced by the halo phenomenon. 
 
There is a situation which could be described as a "backwater" phenomenon.118
 
  The backwater 
phenomenon describes the relative lack of importance to overtly regulate gratuitous transfer 
intermediaries for politicians or administrators.  Such policies are not of great importance to the 
electorate and are not included in political policy platforms.  For politicians it is a policy backwater 
compared to the regulation of crime, commercial fraud, taxation, industrial relations or welfare 
security.  McKay illustrates this point by describing the delays with a New Zealand Inquiry, 
 It is of course quite understandable that a review of the Charitable Trusts Act should not 
be seen as a matter of urgent priority if only because there is no obvious outcry for public 
reform.  Yet the elapse of eleven years - and the review is still of course not concluded - is 
surely too long for even a low-priority item.  If the reference was worthwhile at the outset, 
                                                     
115  Chesterman, op. cit., at p.308; McKay, op. cit., at p.198; H.B. Hansmann, `Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law', op. 
cit., at p.601; J.J. Fishman, op. cit., at p.699. 
116  Douglas and Wright, op. cit., at p.50. 
117  For example, The Australian Securities Commission regulates over 850,000 companies and the British Department of 
Trade and Industry over 998,000. There is still a degree of regulatory default on these registers, but the administrators have 
not conceded that the task is impossible. It will be recalled that charity registers were compared with for-profit corporate 
registers in Chapter Three, refer p.113. 
118  The term "backwater" is adopted from comments made in United Kingdom, Tenth Report from the Expenditure 
Committee, `Charity Commissioners and Accountability', HMSO, London, 1975, at p.xxix; Chesterman also uses the 
notion, M. Chesterman, `Regulation of Charities: Models Here and Abroad', in Charities and Philanthropic Institutions: 
Reforming the Tax Subsidy and Regulatory Regimes, ed. R. Krever & G. Kewley, `Comparative Public Policy Research 
Unit Monash University & Australian Tax Research Foundation', Melbourne, 1991, at p.81 where he writes, "The word 
`backwater' has been used more than once in the literature about charity regulation departments - I certainly heard it when I 
was doing work in this area in England and I have heard it again here." 
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it was surely worthy of more expeditious treatment than it has received.119
 
 
It must also be borne in mind politicians use nonprofit community organisations to provide a presence 
and power base in the community, often feeding off the halo for their required positive electoral 
image.120
 
  Again such a factor mitigates against any political desire to actively stir the still pond of 
current regulatory practices. 
This lack of a political imperative translates directly into a lack of funder's priority for the regulation of 
nonprofit entities.  The halo phenomenon also explains the reluctance of politicians to be seen 
persecuting nonprofit entities by officious regulation.  Thus for funds from the government, it will be 
unlikely regulation of nonprofit entities, will be generously or even adequately funded given its lack of 
political importance and the political risks of offending constituencies. 
 
This stance of politicians is reflected in the behaviours of administrators.  This is further exacerbated 
by most regulation being located in fractured agencies, with nonprofit regulation not one of their core 
activities.  Generally scarce resources are prioritised to core functions at the expense of peripheral 
functions.  Even the centralised Charity Commission has been characterised as "a quiet backwater" 
with, 
 
 a considerable turnover in staff in the junior echelons but at senior level there is 
stability.121
 
 
These under-resourced administrative units out of the main policy stream are not perceived as 
desirable positions either for their status or the prospects of further promotion.  The halo phenomenon 
inclines administrators to the giving of advice, rather than undertaking pro-active regulation which 
could cause undue repercussions for administrators.  The halo phenomenon and the lack of resources 
combine to ensure that "the watchdog of public interests" behaves as a firm of "benevolent family 
solicitors".122
 
  
Resources are lacking for administrators, but this is not entirely the fault of politicians.  Administrators 
have allocated the given resources in a way to limit the existence of pro-active regulation and enhance 
other more comfortable functions.  The institutional nature of the nonprofit entity and the 
administrative agencies together with the state's reluctant to bear the transaction costs of contracting 
and monitoring on behalf of donors, combine to contribute to the regulatory failure. 
                                                     
119  L. McKay, `Comment: Proposals of the Property Law and Equity Reform Committee Working Paper on the Control and 
Supervision of Charitable Trusts', New Zealand Universities Law Review, Vol.8, 1978, pp.198-210 at p.198. 
120  T.R. Ireland, `The Calculus of Philanthropy', in The Economics of Charity - Readings, Institute of Economic Affairs, 
London 1973, pp.65-78 at p.69. 
121  United Kingdom, Tenth Report from the Expenditure Committee, op. cit., at p.xxix. 
122  United Kingdom, Sixteenth Report from the Committee of Public Accounts, `Monitoring and Control of Charities in 
England and Wales', HMSO, London, 1988, at p.5. 
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STATUTORY RIGOUR MORTIS, CLONING AND REGULATION 
 
One of the consequences of charity law being a policy backwater is its legislative reform is not driven 
by powerful stakeholders and is usually initiated by the state.  Many of the reforms to nonprofit entities 
have occurred at times when it is in the interests of the state to have philanthropic gifts directed to 
certain areas of society.123  Admittedly, the state has also to consider established charities that can 
wield the influence of their halo when necessary to protect their interests, but in comparison to other 
lobbies from commerce they are not as aggressive or active with respect to their own regulation.  The 
social welfare lobby124 is well organised in Australia, but has never seriously pursued the regulation of 
nonprofit entities.125
 
  It is contended Australian charity law reform has had a low priority and this has 
contributed to regulatory failure.  This reform not only includes the legal infrastructure, but also the 
framework for the monitoring and control by administrators.  It is characterised by statutory rigor 
mortis and precedential cloning. 
Statutory "rigor mortis" describes a situation where the statutes providing for regulation enter 
suspended animation.  It is characterised by lack of any priority for reform in its own right.  Further 
where the statutory provisions are contained in a fractured administrative agencies' general statute, 
charity issues are overlooked when reforming the rest of the statute.  There is also judicial rigour 
mortis where common law enters suspended animation which will be discussed in a later section of 
this paper.  Judicial rigour mortis is amply demonstrated in an analysis of the definition of charity. 
 
The period between reform of charity law in England and in particular direct regulatory powers and 
strategies of administrators is lengthy.  Until the recent inquiries126 there has been little imagination as 
to the appropriate style of regulation necessary for nonprofit organisations.  The American jurisdiction 
shows similar slack, but can boast of an invigorated debate on the appropriate regulatory strategies for 
nonprofit organisations and a statutory definition of charity led by the Internal Revenue Code.127
 
 
In Australasia the regulatory statutes not only suffer from rigour mortis, but have been subject to some 
inappropriate copying from English sources.  Precedential cloning describes the process of meticulous 
                                                     
123  This theme is illustrated by the interest of the state in Tudor England, Nineteenth Century England and the Thatcher 
government. 
124  For example the Australian Council of Social Services Inc., A.C.R.O.D. and Aged Care Australia. One exception to this 
is the Victorian Council of Social Service between 1978-1983 in its efforts to have an incorporated associations statute 
enacted. 
125  For example in the 1993 election campaign the opposition parties proposed a general consumption tax. The welfare 
lobby played an important part in lobbying against the tax, but from the perspective of their welfare clients rather than its 
effect on gratuitous transfer intermediaries. 
126  That is, since the 1987 Comptroller and Auditor General's Report, `Monitoring and Control of Charities in England and 
Wales', National Audit Office, HMSO, London, 1987. 
127  For example the `Model Nonprofit Corporations Law', The Subcommittee on Model Nonprofit Corporation Law of the 
Business Law Section, American Bar Association, Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 1987, Prentice Hall Law & 
Business, New Jersey, 1987. 
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transplanting of British laws into Australian states, particularly from the colonial period to the Second 
World War.  The theoretical framework of the Australian state, parliament, judicial system and 
bureaucracy was still intertwined with the British Crown and resembled the British model, but the 
reality of the environment of the Australian states was altogether different.  The economy, capital 
infrastructure, social forces and natural environment were poles apart. 
 
This led to some odd results, such as the mortmain laws being applied in a colonial outpost almost 
devoid of a threat of religious bodies locking up vast tracks of taxable land under a "dead hand."128 
The Queensland Collections Act Regulations129 contains a series of outdated prescriptions such as "no 
collector shall use a collecting box at the end of a pole".130  This is a cloning of the Regulations of the 
English Metropolitan Streets Act of 1903131 repealed in 1963132
 
, the object of which was to prevent 
the soliciting of donations from double decker trams, buses and coaches and from the upper storeys of 
terrace houses.  Queensland has never had upper storey terrace houses or double decker public 
transport, with few horse drawn coaches.  The provision still exists in Queensland, despite its lack of 
purpose in a very different society and despite it having been repealed some thirty years ago in 
England.  This may be harmless regulation but it is symptomatic of the phenomena of cloning and 
rigor mortis. 
Legal cloning also has stifled suggested statutory reform initiatives because there has been no statutory 
provision in England.  Again the definition of charity provides an illustration.  The Victorian Chief 
Justice's Law Reform Committee examined charitable trusts in 1962, prompted by the Nathan report 
and the adoption of the Charities Act (UK, 1960).  The Report noted as its impetus that, 
 
 we have to consider whether we should adopt the provision of that Act or some of them.133
 
 
Apart from recommending most of the English statutory reforms, the Victorian Chief Justice's Law 
Reform Committee also agreed with the conclusions of Nathan that drafting a satisfactory definition of 
charity was "beyond human ingenuity".134
 
  Despite being presented with cogent arguments for a 
statutory definition, the Law Reform Committee's Report concluded, 
                                                     
128  A.H. Oosterhoff, `The Law of Mortmain: An Historical and Comparative Review', University of Toronto Law Journal, 
Vol.27, 1977, pp.257-334; Religious Educational and Charitable Institutions Act, 1861 which adopted mortmain style laws 
in Queensland. 
129  The Collections Act 1975 (Qld.). 
130  The Collections Act 1975 (Qld.), reg.21(d). 
131  Metropolitan Streets Act 1903 (U.K.). 
132  Local Government Act 1963 (U.K.). Also see the comment on this provision in P. Luxton, Charity Fund-Raising and 
the Public Interest: An Anglo-American Perspective, Avebury, Aldershot, 1990, at p.28 of also M. Chesterman, 
`Regulations of Charities: Models Here and Abroad', op. cit., at p.82. 
133  Victoria, Chief Justice's Law Reform Committee (Victoria), `Report on Charitable Trusts', Melbourne, 1965, at p.1. 
134  Ibid., at p.4. 
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 We think we should firmly resist the blandishments of those who put logic first and 
disregard history.  But there is in our view an even more compelling reason for not 
attempting to frame a definition.  We consider that in this field we should not depart from 
English Law.  As matters stand, we have the great benefit of decisions given in the courts 
of Great Britain.  We have in the past received great guidance from the decisions of such 
courts and no doubt will continue to do so.135
 
 
This Report has been cited as a good reason for the failure to attempt a statutory definition of charity 
for the next twenty-five years in Victoria and other states.  The New South Wales Review of the 
Charitable Collections Act,136 the first and second reports of the Victorian Interdepartmental Working 
Party137 and the Victorian Parliamentary Committee138
 
 all place much store on the Victorian Chief 
Justice's comments.  There has been some marginally tinkering with a statutory definition in some 
Australian states, but no conceptual reformulation. 
The National Safety Council case study illustrates the regulatory problems created by the cloning of 
statutes and the resulting rigor mortis.  The National Safety Council Victorian Division was a company 
limited by guarantee with a licence pursuant to the Companies Act139 to omit the tag "limited" from its 
formal title and also exempt from lodging annual financial returns and returns of office bearers.  Such 
exemptions were available to certain charitable and nonprofit companies upon application for a 
licence.  The judge found this attribute had led to the possible misrepresentation of the organisation as 
a government guaranteed instrumentality rather than a company with no issued capital and limited 
liability.140
 
  It also meant the financial accounts of a public company were not available for public 
scrutiny, as well as the auditor's qualification of previous accounts which would have certainly lead to 
investigation.  This would have caught the situation at a much earlier stage and mitigated damage, if 
any. 
This state of affairs came about directly through cloning of the statute without due regard for the 
circumstances in England and continued through statutory rigor mortis.  The company limited by 
guarantee was an English corporate form established by the first English code of company law.141
                                                     
135  Ibid., at p.5. 
  
This legislation was almost copied word for word in its entirety by each of the states of Australia, 
136  New South Wales, Chief Secretary's Department, `A Review of the Charitable Collections Act', 1934, Sydney, 1989, at 
p.12. 
137  Victoria, `Administration of Charities', State Government Interdepartmental Working Party, First Report, Victorian 
Government Printer, Melbourne, 1980 at p.17; Victoria, `Administration of Charities', State Government Interdepartmental 
Working Party, Second Report, Victorian Government Printer, Melbourne, 31 March, 1982 at p.14. 
138  Ibid., at pp.34-35. 
139  Companies Act 1915 (Vic.). 
140  Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. Friedrich & Ors. at p.975. 
141  Companies Act 1862 (U.K.), section 9. 
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shortly afterwards, except Western Australia.142
 
  The Queensland Attorney General when introducing 
such company legislation explained, 
 I consider that the mature consideration of English experts should weigh very seriously 
when people bring opposition to bear on the Bill.  I take it that everybody who makes up 
his mind to oppose the Bill or to suggest alterative will take into consideration what has 
been done in England and that great weight should be given to the views of English 
experts.143
 
  
Similar sentiments were expressed in the Victorian Parliament.144
 
  It is not unreasonable that a former 
colony with limited resources ought to look to a successful world power for legislative models, 
especially when their systems of government were interwoven, nor is copying of appropriate statutory 
provisions inherently wrong. 
The flaw in adopting this particular legislation was the Australian states failed to appreciate other 
English regulatory bodies that had been established to supervise charities.  Immediately prior to the 
establishment of the company limited by guarantee in 1862, the English Parliament created the Charity 
Commission.145  The Charity Commission required returns and scrutinised accounts.  The English 
administrative practice was the Board of Trade would not grant a licence to dispense with the tag 
"limited" unless the company was a registered or exempt charity under the Charities Act.146  The 
Charity Commission will not permit companies limited by guarantee registered as charities to trade 
with the public.147
                                                     
142  New South Wales, 37 Vic. No.19, (Companies Act 1874); Queensland, 27 Vic. No.4 (Companies Act 1863); South 
Australia, 27 & 28 Vic. No.13, (Companies Act 1864); Tasmania, 33 Vic. No.22, (Companies Act 1869); Victoria, 27 Vic. 
No.190, Companies Statute 1864); Western Australia, No.82 of 1961, (Companies Act 1961). 
  There was no Charity Commission in Australian states and effectively there was no 
external administrative scrutiny of such organisations, and no restraints on trading with the public.  
The cloning of the company legislation and the exemption for companies limited by guarantee did not 
take into account complimentary legislation and administrative practices and it was only a matter of 
time before a major fraud occurred as a result of the provision.  
143  Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 September, 1931, p.673. 
144  The Hon. Mr Fellows MLC, referred to the legislation as a transcription of the English Act, Victoria, Parliamentary 
Debates, 9 February 1864, Vol.10, 1863-4, at p.68; The Hon. Mr Graves, Parliamentary Debates, 29 August 1883, Vol.43, 
1883, at p.843; as cited in K.J. Levy, An Historical Analysis of Incorporated "Non-profit" Entities in the United Kingdom, 
New Zealand and Australia with the Purpose of Raising the "Profit/Non-profit Debate", Minor LL.M Thesis, University of 
Melbourne, 1993 at p.50. 
145  The Charities Act 1960 (U.K.). 
146  Notes issued by the Board of Trade, p.1, reproduced in L. Berkowitz & G.D.M. Cockain, Companies Limited by 
Guarantee and Unlimited Companies, Oyez Publishing, London, 1977. 
147  This is on the basis that trading itself is not a charitable purpose, it does permit the sale of goods made by beneficiaries 
of the charity and small irregular trading such as fetes and jumble sales. If charities wish to obtain funds from commercial 
trading they are required to establish a separate business. England, The Charity Commissioners, Fundraising and Charities, 
CC 20, 1989 at pp.4-8; H. Blume, The Charity Trading Handbook, Charity Trading Advisory Group, London, 1981 at 
pp.193-195. 
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It was apparent to the regulators in the 1970s that the situation was fraught with danger and this is 
illustrated by refusal of such licences to be granted in all but exceptional circumstances.148  It was not 
until the Corporations Law was proclaimed in 1990, after the National Safety Council fraud case, that 
licences would only be given to omit the word limited from a company's name.149  The corporate 
number must however be used and it is possible that this will defeat the purpose of the company in 
omitting the word "limited".150  In England if the company is a charity and its registered name does not 
include the word "charitable" or "charity" the fact a company is a charity must be clearly stated on all 
public company documents.151
 
  Statutory cloning and rigor mortis combined to directly contribute to 
the regulatory failure in the National Safety Council case. 
Few jurisdictions can boast they have no instances of archaic or inappropriate legislation remaining on 
their statute books.  In many instances the archaic legislation is ignored or so irrelevant that its effects 
are inconsequential.  The lack of law reform addressing the regulation of nonprofit entities has far 
more serious consequences than the continuation of harmless irrelevant legislation.  Once again this 
can be appreciated in the case study of the National Safety Council.  The lack of law reform 
contributes directly to the regulatory failure of administrators to properly monitor and control nonprofit 
entities because of inappropriate statutory provisions. 
 
INAPPROPRIATENESS OF EXTERNAL REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS 
 
Administrators have regulatory instruments they use to monitor and control nonprofit entities.  Such 
regulatory instruments might be the prohibition of certain activities without the grant of a licence often 
containing restrictive conditions, requiring periodic financial and management reports, criminal 
sanctions, adverse publicity and external inspection of the entity's records.  Internal control instruments 
through membership, donor or donee participation in some entity forms are non-existent or seriously 
flawed.  For example, the charitable trust has no members, donees and donors are actively discouraged 
and prevented from making the trustees accountable.  Given the lack of internal regulatory control, it 
might be expected that the state would play a greater role in the supervision of nonprofit entities.  It is 
contended in this section the external regulatory instruments employed by administrators are also 
flawed. 
 
One category of regulatory instruments available to administrators are criminal sanctions.  This is a 
common and traditional regulatory instrument used to encourage regulatory compliance.  It may take 
the form of an automatic "parking fine" style sanction for the non-lodgement of an annual return to 
custodial sentences for controllers of defaulting entities and is widely used in regulation of for-profit 
                                                     
148  M. McGregor-Lowndes, `The Regulatory Compliance of Two Forms of Nonprofit Enterprise', Unpublished Master's 
Thesis, 1989, Griffith University, at p.67. 
149  The Corporations Law (Cth.), section 383. 
150  The Corporations Law (Cth.), section 372. 
151  Section 30C, The Charities Act 1960 (U.K.) inserted by section 11 of Companies Act 1989. 
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organisations.152
 
 
This paper has already examined the issues bearing on administrators which may make it difficult for 
them to be involved in any action which may destroy an entity's halo.  The threat of criminal 
proceedings has the capacity to severely damage most organisation's halos.  If penalties are imposed on 
gratuitous transfer intermediaries or their controllers, there is also the issue of adverse consequences 
for the innocent.  For example if a nonprofit entity through a rogue employee fails to lodge annual 
returns and is therefore liable to a monetary penalty, it is the potential donees who will suffer, through 
no fault of their own.  A similar situation arises with well intended, voluntary but legally ignorant 
managers who unintentionally default.  Utilitarian ethical considerations of the potential consequences 
on the donees tend to present cogent arguments for discretionary leniency rather than an 
administrator's insistence on teleological ethical constructs of immutable principles.   
 
It might be reasoned that the threat of criminal prosecution is a persuasive instrument to control such 
entities.  Specific examples of criminal actions are rare and combined with the mostly voluntary and 
unsophisticated nature of managers who are often unaware of their legal responsibilities, the deterrent 
value of the threat of criminal action wanes.  The traditional for-profit corporate regulatory model of 
using punitive criminal sanctions is inappropriate for the regulation of nonprofit entities. 
 
Similar problems which are not as chronic as those found with nonprofit entities have been widely 
analysed in the context of for-profit corporate regulation.  In the for-profit corporation context, 
innocent shareholders suffer for the sins of middle management and bringing criminal prosecutions is 
perceived as ineffective given the light non-custodial sentences given to white collar criminals.153
 
  
Alternatives to criminal sanction have been suggested such as equity fines, internal audit procedures, 
corporate prohibition and Attorney General enforcement. 
Some of these alternatives can be perceived in the often informal regulatory instruments used by 
administrators.  For example in England, the Charity Commission can initiate a formal investigation 
into the activities of a charity, but prefer to seek the co-operation of management for an informal 
solution to a complaint.154
                                                     
152  It is still widely used regulatory instrument although there is a growing debate on whether to decriminalise the for-profit 
corporations law. 
  This may result in an understanding as to the dismissal of certain 
employees, alteration of management practices or policies or some other mediated solution.  This is 
also the case in New York where administrators will seek confidential consent orders which require 
153  J.C. Coffee, `Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions', 
American Criminal Law Review, Vol.17, 1980, pp.419-471; J.C. Coffee, `No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment', Michigan Law Review, Vol.79, 1981, pp.386-459; R. 
Tomasic, `Corporations Law Enforcement Strategies in Australia: The Influence of Professional', Corporate Law, Vol.3, 
No.2, pp.192-229; R. Tomasic, `Sanctioning Corporate Crime and Misconduct: Beyond Draconian and Decriminization 
Solutions', Australian Journal of Corporate Law, Vol.2, No.1, pp.82-114; P. Grabosky & J. Braithwaite, Of Manners 
Gentle: Enforcement Strategies of Australian Business Regulatory Agencies, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1986. 
154  Cairns, op. cit., at p.32; England, `Report of the Charity Commissioners for England and Wales for the Year 1989', 
HMSO, London, May 1990, at p.19; England, `Report of the Charity Commissioners for England and Wales for the Year 
1990', HMSO, London, May 1991, at p.12. 
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the defaulting charity to behave in certain ways or risk of having the matter referred back for 
prosecution in the courts.  The behaviour identified earlier of the use of advice to controllers of 
nonprofit entities by regulators is perhaps another useful part of a strategy to control gratuitous 
intermediaries.155
 
  It seems not to be the sole solution to the regulatory failure problem.  In any case 
there is a promising path to follow in these alternative regulatory procedures given the problematic 
attributes of nonprofit entities. 
Administrators license nonprofit entities acting as regulatory "gatekeepers".  If an entity cannot legally 
carry on an activity without the approval of an administrator, it provides a tool to regulate entities 
carrying on that activity.  This is a common regulatory instrument in occupations and all types of 
economic activities from primary agricultural production to manufacturing technologically 
sophisticated weapons.  This paper has already pointed to issues involved in the licensing of nonprofit 
entities, such as the registers are not well maintained, monitored or appropriately conceived. 
 
This point can again be illustrated by the National Safety Council case study.  The National Safety 
Council was a company limited by guarantee which was not licensed as a charity, but under the regime 
of commercial corporate regulation.  Because of the restricted definition of charity the NSC was 
classified under an inappropriate licensing system designed to regulate for-profit, not nonprofit 
entities.  It was inappropriately regulated. 
 
This problem is further complicated by extending the charity licensing regime to include companies, as 
has occurred in England.156  Such entities are caught between two incompatible licensing systems 
which produces intractable legal and administrative problems for such entities and regulators.157
 
  
The National Safety Council case study also illustrates the common way around such problems of 
licensing gratuitous transfer intermediaries in commercially orientated regimes by exempting them 
from provisions which run counter to their purpose or activities.  Such exemption leaves holes in the 
regulation of such entities that can lead to regulatory default.  This has already been illustrated in this 
paper in relation to the National Safety Council being exempt from lodging annual financial returns 
and using the tag "limited" in its name. 
 
As has been foreshadowed earlier in this paper, the model of regulation of the company limited by 
guarantee has been taken by default from the regulation of for-profit entities.  The company limited by 
guarantee has been subject not only to a particularly commercial model for its legislation, clearly a 
non-halo jurisdiction, but also its regulators are a totally commercially orientated bureaucracy.  This 
                                                     
155  This does not affect the argument in a previous section of this chapter concerning the use of such strategy to the 
exclusion of other monitoring functions. Such a strategy is only effective as an overall scheme for the regulation of 
intermediaries. 
156  The Charities Act 1960 (U.K.), section 46. 
157  J. Warburton, `Charitable Companies and the Ultra Vires Rule', The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, Vol.52, July-
August, 1988, pp.275-283; J. Warburton, `Charity Corporations: The Framework for the Future?', The Conveyancer and 
Property Lawyer, Vol.54, 1990, pp.95-105. 
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misalignment contributes again to the regulatory failure of nonprofit entities. 
 
The creation of the English corporation by registration in the mid-nineteenth century was to serve the 
demands of the for-profit entrepreneurs.  It was soon realised that many of the essential regulatory 
controls of for-profit corporations were found to be inappropriate for companies limited by guarantee.  
The legislative response was to relax these controls by exemption rather than designing appropriate 
regulation of a nonprofit entity.  This response does not arise from a deliberate policy analysis of the 
issues raised by the facilitation and regulation of philanthropic intermediaries.  Perhaps this is a little 
harsh on nineteenth century policy makers given that only recently has there been academic interest in 
the nature and functions of the nonprofit sector.  It does not excuse current Australian policy analysts 
from continuing the legislative rigor mortis. 
 
Inappropriate regulatory instruments have been used to monitor and control nonprofit entities.  The 
traditional punitive criminal sanctions cannot be relied on as heavily as in other situations to produce 
compliant behaviour.  Monitoring through registries and licensing has not to date been entirely 
successful.  It is argued even if appropriate resources were devoted to such activities, the systemic 
definition of charity excludes some nonprofit entities from the regulation and forces them into 
inappropriate for-profit regimes.  The for-profit regulatory regimes deal with the problems of nonprofit 
entities' non-fit with their regulatory strategies by exempting them.  This effectively produces little 
appropriate regulatory monitoring and control of such entities. 
